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CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUES AND FACTS
Previously submitted briefs of the parties have described the setting of this case.
A few erroneous points brought out by Appellee Christensen require clarification.
2.

The subject of this case is an Employment Agreement between Thrifty
Nickel and Jose and Mildred Salazar. As such it is not a contract
specifically with any particular one of the many Thrifty Nickel companies.
See Addendum C to Appellant's initial Brief.

3.

Salazar's plead facts to support Christensen's individual liability as the
alter ego of Thrifty Nickel. The Salazar's alleged in their Complaint that
the transfer of assets between the three corporate defendants is fraudulent
under an action currently in process in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 99C-31762 (Complaint
^J 35) It was further alleged that transfers of assets occurred at the direction
of defendants Christensen and/or Wilkinson. (Complaint f 36).

4.

The Brief of Appellee on pages 5 and 6 states some of the many allegations
against Mr. Christensen very specifically.

5.

Plaintiffs Complaint states "there should be no corporate veil
distinguishing or protecting the assets o f Mr. Christensen. (Complaint ^f
37)

6.

The only viable defendant remaining in this matter is Robert L.
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Christensen. The remainder of the defendants are either bankrupt
corporations controlled by Mr. Christensen or previously dismissed persons
or corporations.

Appellants encourage the Court to read and consider the cases cited by Mr.
Christensen5s counsel very carefully. Several positions taken by Christensen seem
plausible if one did not actually read the quoted and referenced authorities. Examination
of the underlying rationale may surprise the Court. Many cases are represented as the
opposite of the actual holding. If Christensen had pulled these stunts in a debate meet, he
would have been disqualified. In a hockey game he would be in the penalty box. There
are many blatant misrepresentations intended to mislead the Court. Much of the time,
the authorities cited by Christensen shockingly support the Salazars viewpoint and not
Christensen's position at all. Meaningful sanctions may be appropriate for
misrepresenting to this court the holding of numerous legal authorities and fabrication of
cited authorities to this court.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THE
SALAZARS COULD NOT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST ROBERT
CHRISTENSEN
Christensen's first cite, Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218,

1220 (Utah 1996) is a great case for the Salazars and not Christensen who cites the case.
In Whipple. Id., the trial court incorrectly dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failing
to state a cause of action. The Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty reversing the trial
court for erroneously dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the
complaint did state a cause of action and should not be dismissed. That is the position
the Salazars take on appeal.
The second case Christensen cites to the court, Harmon City, Inc. v. Nelson &
Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995), another Judge Frederick case, is again a super
case for the Salazars and not Christensen. Judge Frederick entered summary judgment
for the defendants and tossed the plaintiffs out of court, ruling that the plaintiffs had
failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted. The Utah Supreme
Court had no problem reversing Judge Frederick's abuse of discretion in dismissing the
lawsuit. The Utah Supreme Court held that material issues of fact existed and ordered
Judge Frederick to allow the plaintiffs to have their day in court for a determination of
what happened, just as we ask this court to rule as well. We commend opposing counsel
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for bringing this very Salazar-favorable case to the court's attention but we condemn
them for arguing that this case supports their position when it is hard to imagine a case
more adverse to their position and more in favor of allowing the Salazars an opportunity
to have their day in court.
Next, Christensen quotes a United States Supreme Court case entitled Conley v.
Gibson. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). This case, again, supports the Salazars' position. In
Conley. id. Justice Black wrote an opinion that is on all fours with the Salazar's position.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs complaint did in fact adequately set
forth a complaint upon which relief can be granted and that the failure of the complaint
to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations was not a sufficient ground for
a dismissal of the case.
Justice Black explains with great insight why the Salazars should win this appeal,
writing:
"The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth
specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its
dismissal is therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules
of CivilProcedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a "short and
plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative
forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified
"notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and
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other pretrial prcedures... (For which the Salazars5 were wrongfully denied by
Judge Frederick in this case). 355 U.S. 41 at page 47. [emphasis added,
comments inserted.]
Justice Black sums up his opinion with the very thing that should be awarded in
this case: the Salazars should get to have their day in court and should not be tossed out
of court on clever arguments to which sympathetic trial judges listen because doing so
will reduce their case load. Justice Black writes further:
"Following the simple guide of Rule 8 (f) that "all pleadings shall be construed as
to do substantial justice/' we have no doubt that petitioners' complaint adequately
set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose
of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." See also Maty v.
Graselli Chemical Co.. 303 U.S.197.
Utah law, in complete agreement with this passage, is set forth in Gill v. Timm.
720 P.2d 1332, 1353 (Utah 1986).
Mr.Christensen cites DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008, to
support his argument that dismissal of a cause of action is proper when there are no facts
to support it. This case is not on point because in Debry the case went to a jury and the
parties had their day in court. This is something the Salazars seek but have not yet
received.
In Boisjoly v. Morton ThiokoL 706 F. Suppl. 795 (D. Utah 1983) a case was
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dismissed because the court held that a violation of criminal statute did not provide a
civil cause of action. This case has no bearing on the present case which involves no
criminal activity. The standards for a complaint in criminal matters are generally higher
than in criminal affairs.
Ledesma v. Dillard Department Stores. 818 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Tex. 1993), is
another criminal case where a person was charged with shoplifting and the court found
that this did not form the basis for a civil complaint. No shoplifting is involved in our
instant case and again no criminal conduct forms the basis for the Salazars' action.
The first legal treatise Christensen cites to the court is Charles A. Wright and
Arthur Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure. Section 1356 (1990). Mr. Christensen left
out the thrust of the article which states:
"The purpose of a motion under Rule 12 (b) (6) is to test the formal sufficiency of
the claim for relief, it is not a procedure for resolving a contest about the facts or
the merits of the case (a point Christensen conveniently leave out that flattens their
position). Thus, the provision must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(1) which
sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim in federal court and calls for "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

"Only when the pleading fails to meet this liberal standard is it subject to
dismissal under Rule 12 (b) (6)

If the complaint is ambiguous or does not

contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the
proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12 (e).
Wright and Miller pages 296, 297. 298. [emphasis added, comments inserted.]
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Mr. Christensen quoted another learned treatise, Moore's Federal Practice. Section
12.34 (1) (a) page 12-56, but they left out the part where Moore states: "Under Rule 12
(b) (6), the party moving for dismissal has the burden of proving that no claim has been
stated. To prevail, the movant must show beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." This language
emphasizes the limited applicability of Rule 12 (b) (6). Not only did Christensen not
prove beyond a doubt that the Salazar's could not have proven an alter ego claim against
Christensen, the Court denied the Salazars any opportunity to conduct discovery or take
the deposition of Mr. Christensen to fully illuminate and clarify the alter ego nature of
Mr. Christensen's operations.
In summary, the Salazars have a strong case against Christensen. They plead it in
their complaint, they alleged that the sham Thrifty Nickel newspaper was the alter ego of
Christensen, noticed up the deposition, and sent out discovery to Christensen in an effort
to substantiate their claims. The Salazar's initial brief in this matter highlighted those
issues.
Mr. Christensen never appeared for depositions and never answered discovery. In
order for there to be justice in this case, the discovery that Salazars propounded should
be answered and Christensen should not be allowed to avoid having his deposition taken
by hiding in Florida under the cover of his some 73 other Thrifty Nickel Newspapers.
Christensen should be ordered to have his deposition taken in this case. The Salazars
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will then be able to provide additional fodder to their alter ego claim.

II.

CHRISTENSEN CAN AND SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR HIS
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
A.

CHRISTENSEN IS PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE
AGREEMENT

Counsel for Christensen took the simplistic position that if someone does not sign
a contract then they cannot be held liable under a contract. This may be good law for the
first few weeks of a law school contracts course but certainly changes in the second
semester. Individuals who did not sign a contract clearly can be held liable under a
number of different theories including, but not limited to, the following:
1. Fraud. If Christensen arranged for the presentation of the employment contract
to the Salazars representing to them that he would provide for their regular
compensation, benefits, and eventual retirement though he had no intention of doing so,
fraud would form the basis for payment under the terms of the contract. See Calamari
and Perillo, The Law of Contracts. Fourth Edition, pp. 325,343-344, which states:
"Whenever a party has fraudulently induced another to enter into a transaction
under circumstances giving the latter the right to bring a tort action for deceit, the
deceived party may instead elect to avoid the transaction and claim restitution
(under contract theory.) Misrepresentation or non-disclosure may render a
transaction voidable even if there would be no tort cause of action for fraud."
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2. Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, Quantum Meruit claims. It is common to
learn in the second semester of Contract Law courses that if someone is unjustly
enriched, as Christensen was unjustly enriched by receiving some $542,000.00 (Five
Hundred Forty Two Thousand Dollars) in earned services for benefits, he is held to terms
of an underlying agreement.
Calamari and Perillo, Id, p. 600, 601 has a section entitled "What is meant by
Restitution? The Concept of Unjust Enrichment." This section provides great insight
into the remedies that should be available to Christensen but for the trial court's dismissal
of their case. Calamari on page 600 writes:
"Restitution encompasses recovery in quasi contract in which form of action the
plaintiff recovers a money judgment. It is also used to encompass equitable
remedies for specific relief such as decrees which cancel deeds, or impose
constructive trusts or equitable liens, as well as some recoveries in equity for the
sums of money. The common thread which draws these actions together is that
'one person is accountable to another one the ground that otherwise he would
unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly suffer loss.9 (emphasis added). A
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other."

In Farnsworth, Contracts. Third Edition, Aspen Law and Business, p. 101 we
learn that one of the goals of contract law is to avoid unjust enrichment to people
affected by contracts.

Farnsworth writes:
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"Finally, we turn to the possibility of a claim by one party often dignified by a
fiction as one based on contract implied in law. . .Money claims based on
restitutionary notions continued to be pressed, however, in many other situations
in which a party would arguably be enriched if allowed to retain without paying
for it some benefit that had been conferred . . .Recognizing that such claims are
not based on the apparent intention of the parties, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania explained that liability may be found in the absence of any
expression or assent to the parties to be charged and may indeed be found in spirt
of the party's contrary intention" See Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 259
A.2d443,449(Pa. 1969)

3. Quasi Contract & Restitution. Farnsworth, Supra, p. 102, defines quasi
contract which refers to any money claim for the redress of unjust enrichment.
Restitution is still a broader term, propagated by American scholars in the twentieth
century to embrace all the remedies having that function, not only claims to money
("quasi-contractual" claims), but equitable relief involving specific restitution, the
constructive trust, the equitable lien, and subrogation.
The Restatement of Restitution Section 1 lays down the broad principle that a
'person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution." See Restatement of Restitution Section 1 and Farnsworth. supra, p. 103.
Mr. Christensen took the position that since he did not sign the contract he cannot
be held liable. Corbin on Contracts. One Volume Edition, West Publishing, 1952, p. 27
discusses implied-in-fact contracts stating: "Something very different is meant by the
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term implied in law', it is an obligation that is created by the law without regard to
expressions of assent by either words or acts."
Thus, Christensen, by motivating the creation of the contract, helping draft the
contract, being involved in discussions about what should be included in the contract
and, for many years benefitting from the contract is a party to the contract. The contract
can be enforced against Christensen.

B.

CHRISTENSEN CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEBTS OF HIS
ALTER EGO CORPORATION.

Christensen cites law and statutes to support their proposition that a shareholder
cannot be held liable "solely by reason that he is a shareholder." See Utah Code Ann.
Section 16-10(l)-622(2).
However, Salazars do not seek to hold Christensen liable just because he is the
shareholder, likely the dominant if not sole shareholder of the bankrupt corporations and
the Thrifty Nickel companies in general. We seek to hold him liable because he is the
alter ego of many corporations he has developed to insulate him for paying just debts.
Salazars have, in their initial Brief, quoted at length extensive Utah law that holds
a person liable for the debts of his alter ego corporations. See Salazar's brief page 25
through p. 38.
Salazars sent out very specific discovery interrogatories, requests for production
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of documents and most importantly a notice of deposition of Mr. Christensen. Judge
Frederick's ruling denied the Salazars any discovery by dismissing the case. This is in
direct contrast to the reasoned opinion of Justice Black in: Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 46
(1957), quoted above on pages 4 and 5, which clearly mandates that full discovery
should be had in these cases, that the pleading is only required to give notice of the
general claim and that the law strongly favors providing a party his day in court.
We ask this Court to keep in mind that the Salazars were not privvy to what
Christensen was doing with regard to his sham corporations as the Salazars were not
shareholders or on the Board of Directors. Since Judge Frederick prevented discovery
from occurring, the Salazars were denied access to critical information.
Clearly, the Salazars likely be able to established both prongs of the test in
Norman v. Murray First Thrift, 896 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). The Salazars believe that
Christensen had set up some 74 other sham thrifty newspapers across the country and
that he was most likely the controlling shareholder or "kingpin" receiving benefits in all
of these alter ego operations. Christensen had a habit and custom of routinely
bankrupting these corporations to avoid creditors which is prong one. Prong two calls
for fraud or injustice. The Salazars were cheated out of over $542,000.00 by the
fraudulent actions of Christensen.
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III.

JUDGE FREDERICK'S ERRONEOUS RULING PREVENTED THE
SALAZARS FROM FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT,
Mr. Christensen cleverly misstated the posture of what happened in the lower

court. The defendant made a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed not one but two
opposition memos against the Motion to Dismiss and very clearly asked the court for
Leave to Amend.
In plaintiffs' original Opposition Memo at page 8, counsel wrote: "Plaintiffs
Move to Amend Their Complaint." If, for whatever reason, the court finds that
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts or causes of action, Plaintiff reserves the
right and hereby moves the Court to Amend his Complaint." (emphasis added).
Clearly, under the rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S.
46 (1957) and the Utah Supreme Court in Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d (1986) the District
Court should have allowed the plaintiff the right to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs'
counsel clearly believed their complaint was proper. The complaint was proper without
discovery being conducted and Judge Frederick committed a reversible error by
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint.
It would be patently wasteful for a plaintiff to amend a complaint if the complaint
is adequate. Christensen's arguments, when reduced to their intent, say that if a court
points out that a complaint is inadequate, it is then too late for plaintiffs to amend the
complaint. This is simply not correct legal logic. Further, a complaint cannot properly
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stretch the facts beyond what is known at the time of filing. The Salazars had, and
continue to have, no way of knowing details of Mr. Christensen's corporate activities.
The courts have provided an alternative mechanism for creating equity by
dismissing a complaint without prejudice. This mechanism allows plaintiff to amend a
complaint the trial judge finds defective. See Fox v. MCI Communications. Corp.. 931
P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). There was no reason for Judge Frederick to dismiss the current
action with prejudice.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Christensen was unjustly enriched if the Salazars' retirement plan and other
benefits are denied them by dismissal of Christensen. This would be gross injustice. We
ask this Court to right this terrible wrong by remanding the case back to the district court
for continuation of discovery and related proceedings.

CONRAD HOUSER
Attorney for the Salazars
Dated: November 17, 2001
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